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Shinran and Authority in Buddhism
Galen Amstutz
Master G^nkO—the eminent founder who had enabled the true es­
sence of the Pure Land way to spread vigorously [in Japan]—and a 
number of his followers, without receiving any deliberation of their 
[alleged] crimes, were summarily sentenced to death or were dispos­
sessed of their monkhood, given [secular] names, and consigned to 
distant banishment. I was among the latter. Hence, I am now neither 
a monk [hisfl], nor an individual in ordinary worldly life [hizota]. 
For this reason, I have taken the term Toku (“ stubble-haired*’] as 
my name.1
1 Yoshifumi Ueda, ed., The True Teaching, Practice and Realization o f  the Pure 
Land Way: A  Translation o f  Shinran’sKyOgyOshinshO, 4 vols. (Kyoto: Shin Buddhism 
Translation Scries, Hongwanji Internationa] Center, 1983-1990), vol. 4, p. 613 (slight­
ly altered for clarity).
2 See Galen Amstutz, Interpreting Am ida: Orientalism and History in the Study o f  
Pure Land Buddhism  (Albany: suny Press, 1997).
J Odo SHiNSflO buddhism—the largest of the traditional Japanese Buddhist institution^—is still widely misperceived. The one dominant impression of Shin is that it is the Buddhism for those who are not disciplined enough to par­
ticipate in the “ real,”  i.e. renunciant (or at least meditative) Buddhist prac­
tices which define “ normative Buddhism.”  The reasons for the development 
of this misleading impression are remarkably complex.2  Yet the essential issue 
in Shinran’s thought and in the subsequent Shin tradition has always been ob­
vious: not an inferiority complex towards monastic Buddhism, but an articula­
tion of a radically independent sense of self-legitimating Buddhist experience, 
a puristic Mahiyflnist “ suddenness.”
Shinran’s teaching was a  comprehensive, systematic reformulation or renar- 
rativization o f the Pure Land mythos based on a rearticulated “ leap”  notion 
of authority. The question of authority has been so visceral that Shinran’s 
rhetoric has historically been difficult for people outside the Shin tradition to 
grasp (including other Japanese Buddhists). A high degree of noncommunica-
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tion has ensued.3 Yet Shinran’s ideas4 can be summarized clearly as a logical 
triangle with three conceptual clusters: enlightenment as eko; the idea of Bud* 
dhist practice as akunin shOki awareness; and the institutional transcendence 
of the lay-monk polarity in the hiso hizoku principle.5
The ekO (“ turning of merit” ) cluster was fundamental. Shinran’s basic in­
sight was that enlightenment had to happen in the final analysis by itself, by 
some process coming as it were from “ outside”  the ego. The term ekO con­
tained two meanings: the spontaneous religious transformation he called abso­
lute “ yielding”  or “ entrusting”  (shinjin) in relation to the deity of the Amida 
Buddha (symbolizing perfect enlightenment), and the revalorization of the 
concepts “ Pure Land”  and “ entrusting” so that they meant perfect enlighten­
ment and basic earthly enlightenment respectively. The deep linkage between
’ Zen schools, for example, often criticized the Shin tradition for its laxity in monas­
tic practices, borrowing the Pure Land rhetoric o f  “ easy practice”  out o f  its Shin con­
text; this ignored Shin’s overt theoretical rejection o f  monastic authority, as well as the 
rhetorical aspect o f  the opposition o f  “ difficult”  and “ easy.”  Scholars in the academic 
monastic traditions rarely even engaged Shin; those that tried, such as Kegon’s Hotan 
(1651-1736), could find the KyOgyOshinshO impossible to understand. (Kiritani Jun- 
nin, KyOgyOshinshO n ik iku , 3 vols., [Tokyo: Kydiku ShinchOsha, 1979], vol. 1, p. 21.)
4 Summaries o f  Shinran’s thought include Yoshifumi (Jeda and Dennis Hirota, Shin- 
ran: An Introduction to his Thought (Kyoto: Hongwanji International Center, 1989), 
Dennis Gira, Le Sens de la Conversion dans i ’Enseignement de Shinran (Paris: Edi­
tions Maisonneuve et Larose (College de France, Biblioth6que de 1’Institute des Hautes 
Etudes Japonaises, 1985), Alfred Bloom, Shinran’s  Gospel o f  Pure Grace (Tucson: 
University o f  Arizona Press, 1965), or Alicia and Daigan Matsunaga, Foundations o f  
Japanese Buddhism, Vol. II, The Mass Movement (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books Inter­
national), pp. 95-106.
5 Shinran’s original ideas were presented, even at their most “ popular,” in a form 
of technical Buddhological writing related to  p ‘an chiao (J., hankyO [kyOsOhanjaku]), 
the East Asian Buddhist tradition o f  justifying a presentation o f  Buddhist doctrine in 
terms o f rankings or modulations o f the accepted textual tradition. (Onp ’an chiao, see 
Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 
181-182, 303-311, 318-319; see kyteOhanjaku in Kaneko Daiei et al., eds., ShinshQ 
shinjiten [Kyoto: HOzdkan, 1983], pp. 108-109.) The pervasive relation to p ’an chiao 
first meant that Shin doctrine was specially concerned about only a very narrow issue, 
the authority question o f  eko. Second, it meant that it was inseparably tied to long­
standing features o f  Pure Land rhetoric and was embedded in the Sino-Japanese 
Mahfiy&na philosophical tradition; it presupposed a shared philosophy and sensibility. 
But presentation o f  Shinran’s doctrines in his own p ’an chiao style—in other words, in 
terms o f his own KyOgyOshinshO schematizations and even their popularizations in the 
wasan and other works—is noncommunicative to any but an informed Buddhist au­
dience.
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these two aspects o f eko was in the fundamental relaxation o f “ normal”  hu­
man ego effort. For Shinran, spontaneous “ entrusting” was the only way en­
lightenment a>uld come about. In terms o f his linguistic reformulation, shin­
jin  was a reliance on “ that power” (tariki), most accurately a reference to the 
power o f the Eighteenth Vow of Amida laid out in the Larger Pure Land 
Sutra as interpreted idiosyncratically by Shinran. In one sense the Vow as un­
derstood by Shinran was the declaration o f a logical tautology, asserting that 
the only condition for perfect enlightenment after death (i.e., rebirth in the 
Pure Land) was a basic enlightenment experience in life; in another, more 
powerful sense the power o f the Vow also lay in the suggestion that the Amida 
Buddha quite independently o f human institutions had a certain dynamic 
energy, an ability to transfer merit (parinOmand) or to spontaneously work to 
effect enlightenment in human minds. In short, eko implied the notion o f 
paramarthasatya (shintai, the truth o f supreme enlightenment) as an active 
agent. The Eighteenth Vow or the “ working o f the Amida Buddha” via ekd 
did not involve monasticism, meditation, texts, other Buddhist deities, and 
any ritual practices understood as able to cause enlightenment intentionally; 
all o f these miscellaneous practices were lumped together under the classifica­
tion of self-power (jirik i), for Shinran’s ekO involved giving up the idea that 
intentional practices had instrumental value in the final analysis.6 The practice 
of vocal nembutsu was also redefined and revalorized, becoming not only the 
sole meaningful ritual but also no more (and no less) than the expression of 
thanksgiving that the deity o f Amida Buddha was constantly engaged in bring­
ing enlightenment about in the course o f ordinary human life.7
6 “ Yielding to the Buddha’’ (shinjin) in Shinran’s Pure Land language was the same 
as the forty-fir^t and higher bodhisattva ranks in conventional monastic schemata. 
(Like earlier Buddhist concepts of sraddhO (“ faith”), Shinran’s shinjin had no mean­
ing outside of its unique context (viz., the idea of “ conversion;”  see Gira). Theories 
about the rapid realization of Buddhahood had already emerged with SaichO and 
KQkai, where spkushin jObutsu meant a stage of basic satoric realization in this life; 
thus the concept was long cunent. (Paul Groner, “ Sokushin jObutsu Traditions at Mt. 
Hiei,” in George J. Tanabe, Jr., and Willa Jane Tanabe, eds., The Lotus Sutra in 
Japanese Culture [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 19891, pp. 53-74.)
7 The interpretation o f nen was the traditional crux. Conventional monastic Pure 
Land teachings understood this to mean a range of practices; popular Pure Land and 
some o f HOned’s followers took it to mean physical vocalization of the name of the 
Buddha; Shinran took it to mean the involuntary satoric shinjin transformation itself, 
only secondarily (and ritually) expressed in the vocalization o f the Buddha’s name.
Shinran’s concept at first looks unconventional, but it was simply a 
restatement o f traditional Mahayana themes. One such theme was the tradi­
tional Mahayana dialectic of the interrelationship and overlap between the
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realms of enlightenment and ignorance. Shinran’s thought, like all Mahayana 
thought, expressed the ultimate identity of opposites combined with the para­
doxical transformation of those opposites into one another; shinjin was mere­
ly an alternate term for the realization of this dual simultaneous samsAra-and- 
nirvana position.8
Even more importantly, Shinran’s idea of eko, although it had no precedent 
in conventional Pure Land interpretation, was but a recapitulation in the Pure 
Land rhetorical context of one of the most ancient problems of Indian 
thought, that of the “ leap”  to religious transformation. The monistic re­
ligious rhetorics which dominated traditional Buddhism contained irresolv­
able logical contradictions because they could not explain the gap between the 
ordinary experience of reality and the Higher Reality, or else, they resorted to 
some conceptual devices (such as levels of reality in various Indian systems) 
which functioned as dualistic explanations anyway. Indeed, the theories of the 
most important Indian traditions in general—including both N&gArjuna and 
bhakti schools—ultimately admitted of no clear formal causal relationship 
(ajativQda) between the state of ignorance and the state of enlightenment;9 the 
idea that the fruit of enlightenment at the end of the path of practice (marga) 
must be “ instantaneously” , i.e., non causally, realized became a universal (if 
implicit) assumption.10 Although in normal institutional practice this situation 
never caused significant doubts about the centrality of classical Buddhist 
monastic life’s ritual and mythos, it raised many persistent logical problems 
about the exact status of the path in relation to the leap.11
* Ueda Yoshifumi, “ The Mahayana Structure o f  Shinran’s Thought, Part I,’’ The 
Eastern Buddhist vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 57-78 and “ The Mahayana Struc­
ture o f  Shinran’s Thought, Part II,”  vol. 17, no. 2 (Autumn 1984), pp. 30-54. But as 
Ueda notes (Part II, p. 54) the trend in Shin rhetoric after Shinran was to speak 
monotonously o f  the shinjin experience as a promise o f  “ rebirth” or karmic liberation 
into the supreme enlightenment, rather than to explore the Mahdydnist complexities o f 
the samsara/nirvAna simultaneity or to pursue the clarification o f  relationships with 
other kinds o f Buddhist rhetoric. The specialized narrowness o f  the ShinshOp ’an chiao 
academic tradition and its political emphasis has made Shinran’s thought seem more in­
tellectually naive than it was.
9 Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions o f  India’s  Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 236-254.
10 David Seyfort Ruegg, Budd ha-nature, M ind and the Problem o f  Gradualism in 
Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception o f  Buddhism in India 
and Tibet (London: School o f Oriental and African Studies, University o f  London, 
1989), pp. 6-8, 141-182.
11 See Ruegg and the essays in Peter N . Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual: A p ­
proaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii
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Shinran’s minimalism restated the spontaneist, ajdtivdda truism utilizing a 
bipolar (rather than a monistic) rhetoric. It explicitly postulated a gap between 
the ideal reality o f paramorthasatya and the problematic ordinary reality of 
ego and attachment. For Shinran, it was only as ego and attachment were dis­
solved and broken down by the activity o f paramarthasatya (Amida Buddha), 
which came as it were from “outside” the troubled ordinary mind, that this 
boundary was softened. Classical Shin doctrine presented this dichotomy 
as never being fully overcomeable in a living person anyway—no human 
experience could become so fluid as to be entirely at one with the perfect 
pratTtyasamutpdda—but what could be achieved, in the state o f Yielding or 
“right assurance,” was an understanding that one had gotten close enough to 
enlightenment in life that one’s unwanted karmic continuation would cease at 
death.* 12 In any case, by (provisionally) situating “enlightenment” and “hu­
man ignorance” as separate spheres, the logical problems of self-reference 
which monistic conceptualization entailed (as in Ch’an/Zen) were eliminated.
Press, 1987). The disputes over the conceptualization o f  the path and the mQrga-
enlightenment relationship eventuated most prominently in the sudden and gradual
controversies associated with Ch’an and in the famous Ch’an-Tibetan debate studied
by Ruegg.
12 Strangely, this particular configuration o f  Buddhist myth had never previously 
appeared in Asian Buddhism in spite o f  the pervasive prior awareness o f  the idea o f  the 
active bodhisattva or buddha, the idea o f  parinama[na] (merit transfer from a bodhi­
sattva) and the generic awareness that final enlightenment must o f  necessity be instan­
taneous.
”  Malcolm David Eckel, To See the Buddha: A  Philosopher's Quest f o r  the Mean­
ing o f  Emptiness (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), pp. 3-4; see also E ckel,4‘Gratitude to 
an Empty Savior: A Study o f the Concept o f  Gratitude in MahAyAna Buddhist 
Philosophy,”  H istory o f  Religions, vol. 25, no. 1 (1985), pp. 57-75.
The idea o f reliance on an “ external” deity—in Shinran’s case AmitAbha— 
was normal in MahAyAna religious life. For example, the texts o f BhAvavive- 
ka, a sixth century Madhyamaka thinker, showed that the concept o f empti­
ness and the concept of the Buddha were inseparable, and that to “ see” the 
philosophical idea was the same as seeing “ the Buddha” and vice versa. Not 
only was emptiness associated with a specific form of sensory perception, but 
visual power yielded concrete visions o f  the Buddha’s physical form which 
might be merged with intellectual understanding in a single philosophical and 
devotional act.13 While the gap between worshipper and Buddha who is wor­
shipped was ultimately broken down in nonduality, that nonduality was in­
separable from the “ dualistic” experience o f concrete manifestation via deity. 
Out of this combination o f self-reliance and dependence on Buddhas and bo­
dhisattvas arose the special irony characteristic o f the more sophisticated
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Mahayana literature: to be truly independent was to realize one’s dependence 
on others, especially spiritual beings manifesting emptiness.14
Shinran’s idea of reliance was more abstract than that of classical Indian or 
Chinese Buddhism. A strong element of visionary experience had manifested 
itself in Shinran’s own youthful experience, and the principles of his doctrines 
were partly discovered in transcendental encounters with Buddhist deities or 
texts. However, once Shinran’s mature doctrine was established, the impor­
tance of classical visionary experience dropped away and played little part in 
the later mainstream teaching.15 Shinran’s interpretation of the Pure Land 
mythos had a relatively modem character because it short-circuited the mediat­
ing feature of conventional Buddhist religiosity which had consisted of the su­
pernormal bodhisattvas and visionary experience. Although the mythic frame­
work had been set up by the efforts of the bodhisattva Dharm&kara in the 
immemorial past, Shinran’s own interpretation of shinjin went directly to the 
“ formless”  or “ non-cognitive” realm of paramdrthasatya as active agent, 
thus bypassing the deities and altered states traditionally cultivated by 
specialists.16 Through eko, ultimate enlightenment (the Amida) communicat­
ed with the world of the human directly, changing the Amida from a more or
14 An important part o f  Bhflvaviveka’s rhetoric was even given over to the concept 
o f “ previous vows’’ (pranidhOna), by which the Buddha expressed his activity to res­
cue humankind (Eckel, To See the Buddha, pp. 17-18, 51-61, 68-83, 147-48). Thus 
gratitude to an “ empty” deity, the symbolized “ otherness”  o f  perfect emptiness, satu­
rated Mahdyana. (Cf. George R. Elder, ‘“ Grace’ in Martin Luther and Tantric Bud­
dhism,” in Houston, G .W ., ed., The Cross and the Lotus: Christianity and Buddhism 
in Dialogue [Dehli: Motilal, 1985], pp. 39-49; Elder discusses how tantric Buddhism 
also can externalize the Buddha’s action as “ grace.” ) These ideas originated separately 
from the Pure Land mythos per se.
15 The Heian genre o f  OjOden (records o f visionary encounter with Amida) tended to 
fade in importance after the Kamakura period. (See Frederic J. Kotas, “ Ojoden: Ac­
counts o f  Rebirth in the Pure Land,” University o f  Washington PhD dissertation 
1987, pp. 198-199.)
16 Shinran’s tariki system paid less attention to the visionary details o f  the mythic 
sambhogakdya or to the physical, concrete engagement with a visionary deity via tradi­
tional practices o f visualization samadhi or even oral nembutsu. Conventionally the 
Pure Land was a hodo  or “ recompensed” land, one o f  the regions o f  existence where 
the sambhogakdya or enjoyment body o f  the Buddha manifested itself, for this was the 
aspect o f the Buddha most associated with the tradition o f  visionary contact; on the 
other hand, supreme perfect enlightenment or dharmaktiya had been something more 
transcendent, beyond and above the hodo  Pure Land. Shinran collapsed the conven­
tional categories so that Pure Land was both hodo  and supreme dharmaktiya in one. 
This shift retained the bipolarity between ignorance and enlightenment but obviated 
the visionary.
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less physical, concretely visualized deity to a relatively abstract representation 
of perfected pra tT tyasam u tpdda . Shinran’s Amida was no longer an object 
either “ interior” or “ exterior,” but was still a transforming “ force” still 
somehow “ other” by virtue o f the gap between ignorance and enlighten­
ment.17
17 The terminology which Shin retained for its own working iconography o f Amida 
images was not sambhogakOya, but hOben hOshin (upOya dharma-bodies), i.e. 
provisional representations o f the supreme ultimate (but not the same as sambho- 
gakoya).
18 Shinran’s understanding o f  karma was subordinated to his overall ideas o f eko  
and akunin shoki. (Leslie Kawamura, “ Shinran’s View o f  Karma,”  in Ronald W. Neu- 
feldt, Karma and Rebirth: P ost Classical Developments [Albany: State University o f  
New York Press, 1986], pp. 191-202 and Ueda Yoshifumi, “ Freedom and Necessity in 
Shinran’s Concept o f  Karma, The Eastern Buddhist N.S. vol. 19, no. 1 [Spring 19861, 
pp. 76-100.)
19 Shinran’s teaching was distinguished by the absence o f  anything that could be 
called famatha (concentrative meditation). If nembutsu recitation in other Pure Land 
teachings or in Zen-oriented systems was primarily a form o f  concentrative meditation, 
Shinran’s idea o f becoming aware o f  the dyadic relationship o f  ego and enlightenment 
was more like vipasyana (“ insight meditation” ). (On the ambiguity o f the uses o f 
famatha in traditional Buddhism, see Ruegg.)
Having done away with the usual intentional and visionary traditions, prac­
tice for Shinran consisted instead o f the recognition o f the bipolarity o f the 
states o f ignorance and enlightenment in everyday life, i.e. the push and pull 
o f human ignorance and Amida’s light.18 This theory o f practice constituted 
the second cluster, akunin  s h o k i  awareness. The “ evil person” (akunin), de­
fined according to Shinran’s special dyadic view, was inherently the true 
object ( s h o k i)  o f the activity o f the Amida. However, Shinran’s rhetoric of 
the power o f the vow and the final “ leap” to basic satori was deceptive in that 
it concealed how much a definite disciplinary regime was built into the ap­
proach, although it was distinctively nonmonastic and mundane. Thus, rather 
than relying on precepts, visualization and meditation, Shinran’s approach re­
lied on critical introspective study of the operations o f the ego in ordinary dai­
ly life and on an eventual recognition o f the polar relationship between the 
suffering produced by these ego operations and the liberation produced by the 
intervention by the p a ra m d rth a sa tya /Amida (from “outside” as it were) into 
the ordinary ego frame.19
Though independent o f tantrism as such as practiced in China and Japan, a 
relationship existed between Shinran’s mild-mannered, mundane introspec­
tive study o f ego and the more exotic transgressive practices o f tantric Bud­
dhism. In each case, the world o f ignorance was examined and exploited as
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part of a systematic scheme to lift and direct attention to the presence of other 
liberatory possibilities. In the case of Shin, one major aspect of this approach 
was the acceptance of sexuality in normal life, or at least a marginalization of 
renunciant sexual control as a main issue.20
Shinran’s ideas about enlightenment via ekO and correct practice as akunin 
shoki awareness culminated in the denial of the essential meaningfulness of 
the monk-lay categories in the obtaining of enlightenment.21 This was the 
third cluster, the hisO hizoku (neither monk nor lay) principle. Conventional
20 But here too there was a difference with specialist tantric practice: where tantra de­
veloped complex and dramatic ritual procedures to merge with the deities and break 
the boundaries o f  ignorance, Shin practice remained mundane, using daily life as the 
object o f  its special kind o f  vipasyana. Although the idea was not theoretically devel­
oped in traditional Shin doctrine, some scholars have suggested that these tantra-like 
themes o f  enlightenment-in-“ transgressionM played a role in Shinran’s marriage, 
which was more complex than its surface character (violation o f  the monastic precepts) 
would suggest. (Minamoto Junko, “ On Shinran’s Marriage," Young East n .s . vol. 10 
(Summer 1984], p. 3, pp. 3-8.)
21 Hosokawa GyOshin, “ Shinran no ‘Mukai myOji no biku* ni tsuite," in Chiba 
Jdrytl and Hataya Akira, eds. Shinran shOnin to ShinshQ (Kyoto: Yoshikawa 
KObundO, 1985), pp. 29-41, discusses Shinran in detail as a “ preceptless monk" or 
“ monk in name only." Shinran has been compared to Vimalaklrti (see Miyai Yoshio, 
Nihon jOdokyO no seiritsu (Tokyo: Seiko shobd, 1979, pp. 201-240] or Mikiri Jikai, 
“ Yuimakyd ni mirareru kairitsu," in Sasaki KyOgO, ed. Kairitsu shisd no kenkyQ 
[Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1981], pp. 329-341), but even the VimalakTrti SQtra (Yui- 
makyO) supports the precepts. Since the Shin teaching is neither monastic nor guru- 
initiated, it is not clear (despite its fund o f practical social wisdom) that the Shin is really 
describable as a traditional bodhisattva path. (Yiin-hua Jan, “ The Bodhisattva Idea in 
Chinese Literature: Typology and Significance," in The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Bud­
dhism  [Waterloo, Ontario: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion by Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1981), pp. 125-152; in the same volume, Hisao Inagaki, 
“ The Bodhisattva Doctrine as Conceived and Developed by the Founders o f  the New 
Sects in the Heian and Kamakura Periods," pp. 165-192; and Leslie S. Kawamura, 
“ The MyOkdnin: Japan's Representation o f  the Bodhisattva," pp. 223-237.) Shin­
ran’s own view was made clearest in the TannishO:
“ In the matter o f  compassion, the Path of Sages and the Pure Land path differ. 
Compassion in the Path o f  Sages is to [intentionally] pity, sympathize with and care 
for beings. But the desire to save others from suffering is vastly difficult to fulfil. Com­
passion in the Pure Land path lies in saying the Name (in shinjin celebration], quickly 
attaining Buddhahood, and freely benefiting sentient beings bearing a [fariJlf] heart of 
great love and great compassion. [Because] in our present lives, it is hard to carry out 
the [intentional bodhisattva] desire to aid others however much love and tenderness we 
may feel; hence such compassion always falls short o f fulfillment." (Dennis Hirota,
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Buddhism had already implicitly agreed that enlightenment involved a “ leap” 
whose exact karmic preconditions were not precisely knowable, but conven­
tional Buddhism had generally accepted without question the mythic models 
o f monasticism or the charismatic teacher in a legitimating Lineage. (Indeed, 
classical monastic Buddhism tended to presuppose a necessary homology be­
tween its experiential and institutional dichotomies, that is, the experiential 
dichotomy between wisdom and ignorance must normally be correlated with 
the institutional distinction between monk and lay.) Shinran’s doctrine reject­
ed the institutional dichotomy while preserving the experiential one. This 
modification o f the institutional theory in Buddhism had major repercussions. 
According to Shinran no person or lineage could mediate the working o f the 
Buddha in another (as distinguished, however, from being able to provide a 
correct religious description o f the tariki enlightenment process). Thus, even 
more than in monastic lineage traditions, Shinran*s theory emphasized the in­
dividual as the independent locus o f enlightenment with minimal conventions.
Buddhism could still be embodied in a community o f followers and in a 
teaching leadership, but not a monastic community and not a monastic leader­
ship. The working principle instead became equal followership (</ddd) among 
persons linked by acceptance o f the tariki theory, replacing the kinds o f hierar­
chy presumed in traditional forms o f Buddhist institutionalization. The model 
for a Buddhist community which emerged from Shinran *s thought was so 
different from the models o f monastic Buddhism that it initiated an entirely 
different politics: it allowed the development o f a new kind o f Buddhist organi­
zation based an an underlying egalitarian principle. Furthermore, putting en­
lightenment theoretically beyond the control o f any specific teacher or any 
specific instrumental practices generated a flexible inclusivity; followers had to 
agree on the tariki principle and on the authority claim o f the Honganji family 
to maintain the proper teaching about it, but did not have to agree on much 
else.
The denial, or marginalization, o f conventional monastic status meant the 
marginalization o f the semantic field associated with either asceticism in the 
traditional institutions or guru-disciple relationships in tantric Buddhism, es­
pecially magic and thaumaturgy (such as conventional merit transfer from 
monks to ancestors). This shift especially involved a denial o f the uses o f mag­
ic and thaumaturgy by states or aristocrats for private purposes and a rejec­
tion o f the use o f Buddhism as an instrument o f political control over the
trans., TannishO: A Primer: A Record o f the Words o f  Shinran Set Down in Lamenta­
tion Over Departures from his Teaching (Kyoto: Ryukoku University, 1982], p. 24; 
slightly altered for clarity.)
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people. Magic and thaumaturgy had been networked with kami and with honji 
suijaku concepts in ways linked to the political power establishment. The re­
jected field of conventional monastic Buddhist semantics also included a range 
of pollution-purity concerns which were connected to the maintenance of the 
oppressive social statuses of women and eta.
Shinran did not attack the traditional mythos of Buddhism so much as go 
completely around it and ignore it in favor of an independent approach. Criti­
cism of monasticism was implicit, but Shin (like Nichiren in yet another way) 
had such a self-sustaining mythos of its own that its propositions did not de­
pend on, and were ultimately not defined by, the contrasts with monasticism.
The three interlocking clusters of ideas in Shinran’s thought were accompa­
nied by a stylistic shift in the presentation of Buddhism, toward a simplifica­
tion of ritual, text and iconography. Nevertheless, Shin shared the general fea­
tures of Mah£y£na tradition with the monastic schools: philosophy, ritual, 
chanting and music, architecture, textual study, moral seriousness (even if the 
formal attitude toward the monastic precepts was different), religious educa­
tion, and karma theory. Indeed what remained striking was not how much 
Shinshu differed from other kinds of Buddhism, but how much it paralleled 
them. Furthermore, even without a sophisticated understanding of Buddhist 
fQnyata philosophy on the part of a follower, Shinran’s rhetoric distinctively 
inculcated strong emotional, ethical and political ideas: the ekb concept yield­
ed a mood of universal hope and, for lack of a better word, “ piety;”  the prac­
tice of akunin shoki awareness taught humility and self-criticism; and hisO 
hizoku gestured toward an absolute idea of underlying human spiritual equal­
ity. These emotional, ethical and political ideas together bonded into a power­
ful new moral field, a field which transcended the old concept of Buddhist 
practice as a gradual progress to rebirth as monk after many karmic cycles.
Of course, even though Shinran’s thought was rooted in traditional 
MahSyanist understandings about the spontaneity of enlightenment, in many 
respects it was also so creatively unconventional, its legitimating claims so for­
mally tenuous, and the political authority implications so serious, that the doc­
trines were open to many criticisms. These became as much a part of the tradi­
tion as Shinran’s ideas themselves. Two major issues stood out: Shinran’s 
difficulties with achieving conventional textual legitimation, and the mislead­
ing outward appearance of the akunin shoki rhetoric which accompanied eko.
Shinran exaggerated the formal validity of his legitimating claims. The tradi­
tional Honganji lineage notion that Shinran reflected Hdnen’s original intent 
has always been doubtful: the Pure Land tradition closest to HOnen was prob­
ably Benchd’s Chinzei-ha and its teachings about the literal nembutsu, the con­
ventional Pure Land, and the residual monastic path. However, the most fun­
damentally problematic issue was Shinran’s technique of using the Buddhist
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scriptures to justify his ideas. Successful normal interpretation required meet­
ing the expectations of received Buddhist conventions: texts had to be accept­
able, word definitions and usage had to be acceptable, and a schematic concep­
tual structure Had to be set up and aligned with traditional Buddhist concerns. 
Instead, Shinran imposed his ekO  ideas on his materials and reorganized the 
conventional terms to fit his purposes.22 Indeed, Shinran generated his dry 
and nonvisionary rhetoric of Buddhist enlightenment by stringing together con­
ceptual and linguistic bits from a body of Buddhist rhetoric which was in fact 
largely visionary; this process required a particularly creative recombinant 
hybridization of inherited East Asian Buddhism. The idiosyncratic intellectual 
discourse which resulted was highly rational, sophisticated and systematic on 
its own terms, and yet was at the same time forced and artificial with respect to 
its original source texts.23 Consequently, Shinran’s handling was simply not 
persuasive to the normal, i.e. monastic, community.
22 The notion that Shinran’s “ leap” ideas could be read into any o f  the seven 
“ patriarchs”  he selected for his mythos was implausible. (According to Shinran’s theo­
ry, the elements o f  tariki teaching had been found in seven o f  the major earlier 
teachers: Nagflrjuna, Vasubandhu, Tan-luan, Tao-ch’o , Shan-tao, Genshin, and H0- 
nen.)
23 The approach had a Rube Goldberg quality, and like a Rube Goldberg invention 
required a certain suspension o f  disbelief. Shin apologists even in English have too 
often maintained a disingenousness about this relationship and presented the difficult 
p ’an chiao texts as if  they were intelligible at face value. This remains one o f  the barri­
ers to  the intelligibility o f  Shinran’s language outside o f  the Shin community. (See Luis 
O. Gdmez, “ Shinran’s Faith and the Sacred Name o f Amida,” M onumentaNipponica 
vol. 38, no. 1, esp. pp. 81-84.) Where this problem has been recognized, it has been ad­
dressed mainly in the limited terms o f  how Shinran’s readings o f  the source texts 
diverged literally from the normal readings. (See e.g ., Ueda, Kyogyoshinsho for notes 
on Shinran’s variant readings.)
The most confusing aspect of Shinran’s rhetoric was the embedded lan­
guage of the “ easy”  path of yielding to Amida as opposed to the “ difficult” 
path of the monastic sages. Language subordinating Pure Land to monastic 
Buddhism had naturally been built into Pure Land rhetoric from India on­
wards and was part of its received conceptual structure. In Shinran, the easy 
path language was merged with what appears to be Shinran’s own distinctive 
personal language of self-abnegation.
1 know truly how grievous it is that I, Gutoku Shinran, am sinking in 
an immense ocean of desires and attachments and am lost in vast 
mountains of fame and advantage; so that 1 rejoice not at all at enter­
ing the stage of the truly settled [shinjin] and feel no happiness at
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coining nearer the realization of true enlightenment. How ugly it is! 
How wretched!24
24 As translated in Ueda, KyOgyOshinshO, vol. II, p. 279; cf. Suzuki, D.T. trans, and 
commentary, The KyOgyOshinshO: The Collection o f  Passages Expounding the True 
Teaching, Living, Faith and Realizing o f  the Pure Land (Kvoto: ShinshU Otaniha, 
1973), p. 140. Cited for example in Takahatake Takamichi, Young Man Shinran: A  
Reappraisal o f  Shinran’s  Life (Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion by Wil­
frid Laurier University Press: Waterloo, Ontario, 1987), p. 102 or Bloom, p. 29.
25 See especially Shinran’s invented term for himself, Gutoku. Suzuki, for example, 
glossed this as consisting o f  two Chinese characters meaning literally “ ignorant” and 
“ bald-headed.” This suggested Shinran’s unworthiness to be in the monastic priest­
hood, his commonness, his stupidity. (Suzuki, KyOgyOshinshO, pp. 140, 212; viz. also 
the paradigmatic treatment by Bloom, pp. 28-30.)
26 Band© Shdjun, “ Shinran no kairitsukan,”  in Sasaki KydgO, ed. Kairitsu shiso no 
kenkyO (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1981), pp. 555-579. More accurately than Suzuki, 
Ueda and Hirota gloss the meaning o f  the character “ Toku”  in the name Gutoku as 
short-haired, stubble-headed, or badly-shaven. The term was used to describe the hair 
o f monks who had let it grow out longer than appropriate; thus it was a term o f deri­
sion for those who broke the precepts. (Shinran: A n Introduction to His Thought, p. 
34.) In the terms o f  his own tariki thought, Shinran’s self-appellation o f  Gutoku is best 
considered a complex irony directed not only at himself but at the monastic institution.
27 The Gutoku passage cited is the only statement like it in the KyOgyOshinsha; a few 
other statements along these lines appear in the Tannisho, a posthumous work by one
Modern commentators especially have latched onto this passage to show that 
as an individual Shinran was lacking in self-confidence or self-respect and that 
somehow this individual failure is the key to the tradition.25 However, while to 
some extent Shinran (like any Buddhist intellectual) was clearly an individual 
with a profound sense of self-analysis, treating the self-reflection passages in 
isolation radically ignores the impersonal larger context of Shinran's lan­
guage. In actuality, the statements on self-reflection were part of the compre­
hensive interpretation systematically reconstructed around eko, hiso hizoku 
and particularly the regime of akunin shoki practice. Since akunin shOki 
represented a particular kind of sophisticated mythic approach, the language 
of self-abnegation had a strongly rhetorical quality and served as a structural 
aspect of Shinran’s bipolar Buddhist conceptualization. When Shinran used 
the character gu (“ foolish” ) famously to describe himself in the KyOgyOshin- 
sho and some other works, it was in the sense of “ precept breaker,”  thus 
establishing his nonmonastic Buddhist mythos.26 The explicit language of 
self-criticism or self-abnegation actually occupied only a small portion of 
Shinran’s doctrinal corpus.27
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Overall, Shinran’s writing was quite preponderantly sOtra-based MahayS- 
nist language manipulated at both popular and technical levels. He was not 
a confessional writer, but a systematic mytho-philosopher. No unambiguous 
evidence exists that Shinran thought of his approach as inferior to the monas­
tic one. Some o f Shinran’s original remarks, as well as the attitude of the later 
tradition, suggest that he even directed a certain amount of sarcasm towards 
monasticism which is concealed behind the surface rhetoric of “ easy” and 
“ difficult.”
(I]f you imagine in me some special knowledge of a way to birth 
other than the nembutsu or a familiarity with the writings that teach 
it, you are greatly mistaken. If that is the case, you would do better 
to visit the many eminent scholars in Nara or on Mt. Hiei and inquire 
fully of them about the essentials for birth. I simply accept and en­
trust myself to what a good teacher told me, “ Just say the Name and 
be liberated by Amida” ; nothing else is involved.* 24 *
o f Shinran’s followers which is thought to record some o f his oral teaching. However,
almost all o f  the language o f self-criticism or despair in Shinran occurs in the wascrn
verse set ShOzOmatsu wasan (verses on the mappO decline o f  the dharma), where the
overt subject is the decline o f  monastic Buddhism, which accentuates the need for Shin­
ran’s ekb  theory. Thus almost every such passage can be assimilated to Shinran’s imper­
sonal tariki theory. In a very few places the personal voice o f  Shinran seems to appear
(for example, his reflection on his own egoistic desire to be a teacher (Ryukoku Univer­
sity Translation Center, ShOzOmatsu Wasan: Shinran’s  Hymns on the Last Age,
Kyoto: Ryukoku University Press, 1980, no. 116, p. 120).
“  Hirota, Tannisho, pp. 35-36; slightly altered.
29 Takahatake, pp. 5-6, 89. The first words in the Kyogyoshinsho are hisokani omon- 
mireba and tsutsushinde:
“ I reflect within myself [hisokani omonmireba]: The universal Vow difficult to 
fathom is indeed a great vessel bearing us across the ocean difficult to cross. . . . Rever­
ently [tsutsushinde] contemplating the true essence o f  the Pure Land way . . . ” (Ueda, 
KyOgyOshinshO, vol. 1, p. 57, 63; Kiritani, vol. I, pp. 76, 102). However, hisokani 
(“ keeping it to o n ese lf’) and tsutsushinde (“ with restraint, with self-control, fearing 
danger” ) can also be rendered as “ carefully,”  “ circumspectly”  or “ cautiously;” such 
renderings would be in consonance with the original political environment which faced 
Shinran. Of course, later interpretation, especially as routinized in the Tokugawa 
period, tried to emphasize the innocuousness o f  the tariki theory o f  authority.
It may be assumed that Shinran was aware that he was issuing a challenge to 
the mythos of monastic Buddhism and its authority.29
This ex-insider’s conflicted relationship with normal Buddhist authority and
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its mytho-philosophical conventions may be the real key to Shinran. Above 
all, nothing about the subsequent history o f the Shin tradition suggested a 
weak sensibility lacking in energy or activity. Shinran’s successors and the larg­
er Shin doctrinal tradition which grew out o f the original work stressed posi­
tive Shinranian themes o f the inclusiveness o f the tariki hongan (“ Main Vow 
of the other-power” ) and the construction of the universal kyOdan (communi­
ty o f the teaching). This community became the largest, richest, most indepen­
dent, and most active in traditional Japan. Thus, far from being simply a 
“ failed monk,” behind the masks o f technical interpretation and his own self- 
deprecation, Shinran may be construed as being one o f the most shrewdly and 
profoundly rebellious individuals in East Asian history.
146
